This week’s newsletter gives an update on the planned removal of BIP61 reject messages from Bitcoin Core, links to further discussion about SIGHASH_NOINPUT_UNSAFE, analyzes some new features in the Esplora block chain explorer, provides information about an updated node ban list, and links to videos of talks at the recent MIT Bitcoin Club Expo. Also provided are a new weekly section about adoption of bech32 sending support and the normal list of notable changes in popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects.
- ● Help test Bitcoin Core 0.18.0 RC2: The second Release Candidate (RC) for the next major version of Bitcoin Core has been released. Testing is still needed by organizations and experienced users who plan to run the new version of Bitcoin Core in production. Use this issue for reporting feedback.
● BIP61 reject messages: as summarized in last week’s newsletter, several developers complained about BIP61 reject messages being disabled by default in upcoming Bitcoin Core 0.18.0, especially since notice of this was only given shortly before that planned release. Bitcoin Core developers discussed the issue and decided to re-enabled BIP61 by default for the 0.18.0 release but describe it as deprecated in the release notes. They plan to disable it by default in 0.19.0 (expected around October 2019) and potentially remove it either then or at some later point.
● Mailing list move: as announced on each list, the bitcoin-dev and lightning-dev mailing lists will be moving to the Groups.io discussion hosting service in the near future. The lists will remain operable at their current addresses until the migration is complete, at which point subscribers should receive a notification. If you don’t want Groups.io to learn your subscriber information, you should unsubscribe from the lists immediately. You do not need to create a groups.io account at this time.
● More discussion about SIGHASH_NOINPUT_UNSAFE: Anthony Towns started another thread about ensuring the proposed noinput sighash mode is hard to misuse in ways that could result in loss of funds. Noinput can enable an alternative onchain enforcement layer for LN that’s more suitable for channels with multiple participants, ultimately allowing a greater number of channels to be opened in the same amount of block space. Towns describes a reasonably plausible worst-case scenario where failure to ensure noinput safety puts adoption of other valuable protocol features at risk. To avoid that happening, he proposes refinements to earlier ideas about output tagging (see Newsletter #34) and a new alternative that would require every transaction with a signature that uses noinput to also contain a signature that doesn’t use noinput. This would prevent third-parties from executing replay attacks with noinput transactions, but it would mean that the most efficient use of taproot couldn’t be used and so would result in moderately larger transaction sizes when noinput was being used.
● Esplora updated: Nadav Ivgi announced an update of this open source block chain explorer. (See our coverage of its initial release in Newsletter #25.) Unconfirmed transactions are now displayed with an estimate of how long it will take them to confirm given current network conditions, or an overpayment warning if they pay more than necessary to be confirmed quickly. Perhaps more notably, the details view for both confirmed and unconfirmed transactions provides an analysis of the features and anti-features used or omitted from the transaction. For example: use of segwit, address reuse, inconsistent output precision, matching an unnecessary input heuristic, inconsistent input/output script types, and changeless transactions.
After seeing the new changes, Ryan Havar raised concerns on Reddit about the possibly high rate of false positive privacy warnings, leading to him opening an issue on Esplora’s GitHub about the problem. Attempting to address these concerns, Ivgi started a conversation with several Bitcoin Core developers. Privacy advocates may wish to review this conversation, which covered topics such as:
Gregory Maxwell and Pieter Wuille believe Bitcoin Core would occasionally match Unnecessary Input Heuristic #2 (UIH2) since the release of Bitcoin 0.1 in 2009, with increasing frequency in more recent releases, making this heuristic less useful than hypothesized for distinguishing between commercial services and end-user wallets.
Bitcoin Core’s coin selection updates over the past two releases allow it to frequently produce transactions without change outputs. These transactions are more efficient and more privacy preserving than transactions with change, but Esplora currently displays them in red as privacy-leaking transactions because they also match the pattern of the user using a “max send” feature to send all their bitcoins from one wallet to another wallet or exchange.
Maxwell proposed that a useful addition to the privacy analysis would be identifying when a user controlled multiple UTXOs received to the same address but only sent a transaction spending a subset of those UTXOs. This behavior makes it possible to connect later transactions spending those UTXOs to the earlier transaction, destroying privacy.
Overall, it’s great to see developers building tools that help people identify flaws in their software or their behavior, but it’s also important to consider how users will interact with the tool. As Wuille said near the end of the conversation: “I am super happy that there is a decent explorer now for debugging stuff out there, but I’m concerned about making it sound like it’s an actual production tool. I know people will use explorers, and one that gives good information is better than one that confuses everything. But, really, we shouldn’t encourage using [it]. If this privacy detection feature causes people to go look up all their transactions because of a gamification like feeling ‘oooh let’s see how my transaction did here?!’, it’s probably a net negative. […] The most important thing to put on a block explorer is ‘Warning: looking up your own addresses on a block explorer leaks your privacy to the site operator’.”
● Spy node ban list updated: some IP addresses are performing various attacks that are likely aimed at monitoring transaction propagation so that they can attempt to determine which nodes originated which transactions. To help node operators refuse connections from those IP addresses, Gregory Maxwell maintains a ban list that can be imported into Bitcoin Core and compatible nodes. There is absolutely no need to use this centralized list—your fully decentralized node will attempt to connect to a diverse enough set of peers that it should establish at least one honest connection—but using this ban list may reduce the amount of traffic you waste on spy nodes and other bad actors. The list comes in two formats, one for use on the command line with bitcoin-cli and one that can be pasted into the debug console of Bitcoin Core GUI. The blacklisted IP addresses are banned for one year and Bitcoin Core will remember the bans between restarts, so you only need to import the list once. Note: some users have reported that the ban list may exceed the maximum buffer size for the GUI on some platforms, requiring pasting it in chunks of about 250 entries each in order to load the whole list.
● MIT Bitcoin Club 2019 Expo videos available: a series of talks from the exposition two weeks ago have been split into individual videos and uploaded to YouTube. We’ve heard that many of the talks were excellent, so consider browsing the playlist for topics that sound interesting to you.
Bech32 sending support
Week 1 of 24
Bech32 native segwit addresses were first publicly proposed almost exactly two years ago, becoming the BIP173 standard. This was followed by the segwit soft fork’s lock-in on 24 August 2017. Yet, seventeen months after lock-in, some popular wallets and services still don’t support sending bitcoins to bech32 addresses. Developers of other wallets and services are tired of waiting and want to default to receiving payments to bech32 addresses so that they can achieve additional fee savings and improved privacy. Bitcoin Optech would like to help this process along so, from now until the two-year anniversary of segwit lock-in, each of our newsletters will include a short section with resources to help get bech32 sending support fully deployed.
Note, we are only directly advocating bech32 sending support. This allows the people you pay to use segwit but doesn’t require you to implement segwit yourself. (If you want to use segwit yourself to save fees or access its other benefits, that’s great! We just encourage you to implement bech32 sending support first so that the people you pay can begin taking advantage of it immediately while you upgrade the rest of your code and infrastructure to fully support segwit.) To that end, this week’s section focuses on showing exactly how small the differences are between sending to a legacy address and sending to a bech32 address.
Sending to a legacy address
For a P2PKH legacy address that you already support such as 1B6FkNg199ZbPJWG5zjEiDekrCc2P7MVyC, your base58check library will decode that to a 20-byte commitment:
This commitment is inserted into a scriptPubKey template:
OP_DUP OP_HASH160 OP_PUSH20 6eafa604a503a0bb445ad1f6daa80f162b5605d6 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
Converting the opcodes to hex, this looks like:
This is inserted into the scriptPubKey part of an output that also includes the length of the script (25 bytes) and the amount being paid:
amount scriptPubKey |--------------| |------------------------------------------------| 00e1f505000000001976a9146eafa604a503a0bb445ad1f6daa80f162b5605d688ac | size: 0x19 -> 25 bytes
This output can then be added to the transaction, which is then signed and broadcast.
Sending to a bech32 address
For an equivalent bech32 P2WPKH address such as bc1qd6h6vp99qwstk3z668md42q0zc44vpwkk824zh, you can use one of the reference libraries to decode the address to a pair of values:
These two values are also inserted into a scriptPubKey template. The
first value is the witness script version byte that’s used to add a
value to the stack using one of the opcodes from
The second is the commitment that’s also pushed onto the stack:
OP_0 OP_PUSH20 6eafa604a503a0bb445ad1f6daa80f162b5605d6
Converting the opcodes to hex, this looks like:
Then, just as before, this is inserted into the scriptPubKey part of an output:
amount scriptPubKey |--------------| |------------------------------------------| 00e1f505000000001600146eafa604a503a0bb445ad1f6daa80f162b5605d6 | size: 0x16 -> 22 bytes
The output is added to the transaction. The transaction is then signed and broadcast.
For bech32 P2WSH (the segwit equivalent of P2SH) or for future segwit
witness versions, you don’t need to do anything special. The witness
script version may be a different number, requiring you to use the
OP_16 opcode, and the commitment may be a
different length (from 2 to 40 bytes), but nothing else about the output
changes. Because length variations are allowed, ensure your fee
estimation software considers the actual size of the scriptPubKey rather
than using a constant someone previously calculated based on P2PKH or
What you see above is the entire change you need to make on the backend of your software in order to enable sending to bech32 addresses. For most platforms, it should be a very easy change. See BIP173 and the reference implementations for a set of test vectors you can use to ensure your implementation works correctly.
Notable code and documentation changes
● LND #2022 allows the creation of “hold invoices”. These are standard LN invoices that are processed differently when payment is received. Instead of the receiver immediately returning the payment preimage in order to claim the paid funds, the receiver delays up until the maximum allowed by the payment timelock. This allows the receiver to accept or reject the payment subsequent to knowing that the money is available. For example, Alice could automatically generate hold invoices on her website but wait until a customer actually paid before searching her inventory for the requested item. This would give her a chance to cancel the payment if she couldn’t deliver. Other example use cases are provided in the PR’s main description.
● LND #2618 implements most of the code necessary for an initial version of watchtower client support that will allow an LND node to pair with a private watchtower and send it encrypted state backups. The watchtower can then monitor the block chain for attempted channel contract breaches and submit breach remedy (justice) transactions that prevent the honest party from losing funds. See the notable code changes sections of our previous newsletters for coverage of the commits implementing the server-side watchtower changes: #7, #19, #22, and #30.